Campaigning for retirement: State teacher union campaign contributions and pension generosity |
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| Institution: | 1. University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA;2. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, USA;1. Department of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, USA;2. FAME|GRAPE, ul. Mazowiecka 11/14, 00-052, Warsaw, Poland;1. University of Valencia, ERI-CES, Spain;2. Faculty of Economics, Avda. dels Tarongers, s/n, 46022, Valencia, Spain;1. Sao Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Brazil;2. Center for Engineering, Modeling and Applied Social Sciences (CECS) and PPGE, Federal University at ABC (UFABC), Brazil;3. Treasury Specialist at BRF, Brazil;1. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, India;2. Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy (CSSSC), Calcutta, India;3. CES–ifo, Munich, Germany;4. GEP, Nottingham, UK;5. National Law University, Delhi, India;6. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India;1. Aarhus University, Department of Economics, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210, Aarhus V, Denmark;2. The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15, Stockholm, Sweden;3. Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute for Sociology and Social Research, Gebäude D4, 3. Stock Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Wien, Austria;1. Department of Economics and Law, Korea Military Academy, 574 Hwarang-ro, Seoul, Republic of Korea;2. School of Economic, Political & Policy Science, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX, 75080, USA |
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| Abstract: | Since Tullock (1972) first asked why there is so little money in U.S. politics, several studies have found evidence that political activism has the potential to yield significant returns. This study is the first to directly investigate the returns to public sector union activism by leveraging a transactions-level dataset from the National Institute on Money in Politics to estimate the relationship between teachers' union campaign contributions and the generosity of teacher pension systems. Our results show that more politically engaged teachers’ unions, as evidenced by their aggregate campaign contributions, are successful at both securing a higher level of retirement benefits and at shifting a greater burden of the financing of those benefits to the sponsoring government. Our estimates are in line with recent related studies and imply an investment return on campaign contributions of nearly 1500%. |
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| Keywords: | Interest groups Campaign contributions Pensions Public sector unions J3 J45 H75 |
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