| Abstract: | In this paper, we consider a general equilibrium model in which the economies are characterized by the distribution of firms on a set of branches of production; we will show that based on the decisions of the managers of the firms, it is possible to build a dynamic system whose solutions reproduce the possible trajectories of the economy. Once the initial state of an economy is known, that is, the initial distribution of firms, we will have a unique solution for this dynamic system, which will coincide with the evolution of the economy, that is, the evolution of prices and equilibrium allocations.The investment decisions of the administrators of the companies will change the distribution over the set of existing productive branches, which in turn will produce changes in the wealth of consumers who are also shareholders of the companies and then as a consequence, their demand will change, and therefore the equilibrium allocations and prices will too.In most cases, these decisions lead to an improvement in the efficiency of the productive side of the economy and an increase in the welfare of the economy as a whole, but, as we will show, under some particular circumstances, even when it comes to rational decisions from the point of view of administrators, this can lead to undesirable repercussions on the welfare of consumers. Besides, in a neighborhood of a critical economy, even when these decisions may involve small changes in the distribution of companies, they can cause abrupt and unexpected changes in the behavior of the economy, or in other words, they can cause an economic crisis. These are characterized by large changes in the prices, in the demand, and in the supply of goods. In contrast, in a sufficiently small neighborhood of a regular economy, small changes in the distribution of firms produced by the investment decisions of managers do not lead to large changes in the subsequent behavior of the economy. We will exemplify these statements with several numerical examples. |
