Differences matter: The effect of coup types on physical integrity rights |
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| Institution: | 1. Aarhus University, Department of Economics, Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210, Aarhus V, Denmark;2. The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15, Stockholm, Sweden;3. Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute for Sociology and Social Research, Gebäude D4, 3. Stock Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Wien, Austria;1. Department of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy, USA;2. FAME|GRAPE, ul. Mazowiecka 11/14, 00-052, Warsaw, Poland;1. Sao Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Brazil;2. Center for Engineering, Modeling and Applied Social Sciences (CECS) and PPGE, Federal University at ABC (UFABC), Brazil;3. Treasury Specialist at BRF, Brazil;1. Department of Economics and Law, Korea Military Academy, 574 Hwarang-ro, Seoul, Republic of Korea;2. School of Economic, Political & Policy Science, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX, 75080, USA;1. Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Kolkata, India;2. Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy (CSSSC), Calcutta, India;3. CES–ifo, Munich, Germany;4. GEP, Nottingham, UK;5. National Law University, Delhi, India;6. Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India;1. Research Department, Budget Office, Ministry of Finance, Teatinos 120, Santiago, Chile;2. Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad Andrés Bello, Santiago, Chile |
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| Abstract: | What is the effect of coups d’état on repression? Do ‘bad’ coups against democracies decrease respect for physical integrity rights? Does it make a difference whether a coup d’état is staged by the military or a civilian leader? We argue that the impact of coups on repression varies with regime type as this determines the relative costs of repression and buying political support. Combining updated panel datasets on democracy and coups d’état from 1960 to 2010, we provide an analysis of the effects of coups on physical integrity rights, differentiating post-coup regime type. We find that post-coup respect for physical integrity rights decreases when non-democratic regimes depose democratic regimes through a coup d’état - an effect which is fading over time. As opposed to military autocracies, civilian-led regimes are more repressive in the year after successfully ousting the previous government. Together with supplementary findings on democracy-inducing and failed coups, our findings show that differences in regime types do matter in research of coups d’état. |
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| Keywords: | Selective incentives Coup d’état Repression Regime type |
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