The initiative,referendum, and distribution of income: An empirical analysis of Swiss cantons |
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Affiliation: | 1. University of Lucerne, Faculty of Economics and Management, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002, Lucerne, Switzerland;2. University of St. Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 19, 9000, St. Gallen, Switzerland;1. University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA;2. University of Arkansas at Little Rock, USA;1. ifo Institute, Germany;2. CESifo, Germany;3. ZEW, Germany;4. IZA, Germany;5. University of Mannheim, Germany;1. Nordic Institute for Studies in Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU), Norway;2. Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway;1. College of Business Administration, Department of Accounting, Finance, & Economics, Winthrop University Rock Hill, SC, 29733, USA;2. Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, 79409, USA |
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Abstract: | This study examines how direct democratic institutions affect income distribution before and after taxes. Based on a panel of Swiss cantons from 1945 to 2014, we test the effects of the constitutional reforms of direct democratic instruments. Our findings show that better voter access to the initiative induces policy shifts that significantly decrease top incomes and benefit the upper middle class. For the popular referendum we do not find such effects. The income effects of direct democracy are not a consequence of shifts in fiscal redistribution, but rather result from policy changes affecting pre-tax incomes. |
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Keywords: | Direct democracy Institutions Inequality Redistribution Switzerland D31 D72 H23 |
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