Corporate governance,ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Accounting, School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China;2. Department of Accounting, Business School, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China;1. Sabanci University, Turkey;2. Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey, Turkey;3. Northwestern University, Pritzker Law School, Kellogg School of Management, United States;4. WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, Germany;1. La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University, Australia;2. UQ Business School, University of Queensland, Australia |
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| Abstract: | This study analyses the role of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism. We study cross-national differences between companies with different level of investor protection. In addition, we account for the type of owner (young family vs. non-young family businesses) and the owner’s relationship with a second significant shareholder (monitoring vs. collusion). When the main owner has effective control over the firm (i.e., absolute control or less than absolute control but without the control of a second significant shareholder), the relation between ownership concentration and firm value is U-shaped. Our findings also suggest that the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders are weaker for companies with higher investor protection and young family-owned businesses. |
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| Keywords: | Corporate governance Young family-owned business Main owner Expropriation Firm value |
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