Corruption in international business |
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| Institution: | 1. Villanova University School of Business, 800 Lancaster Ave, Villanova, PA 19085, United States;2. University and George Holmes, Emeritus, University of Nebraska, College of Business, Lincoln, NE 68588, United States;3. Game Development Program, Guild Hall, Southern Methodist University, Plano, TX 75024, United States;1. Department of Economics, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA;2. School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA, USA;3. Department of Economics, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX, USA;1. World Affairs Council of Atlanta, Georgia State University, GSU Buckhead Center, Tower Place 200, Suite 500, 3348 Peachtree Road NE, Atlanta, GA 30326, United States;2. Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, United States;3. Institute of International Business, Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, United States;4. Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, United States;1. University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA;2. Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia;3. University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia |
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| Abstract: | I analyze corruption in international business, presenting a critical assessment of the topic and providing suggestions for future research. I argue that corruption creates a laboratory for expanding international business studies because its illegal nature, the differences in perception about illegality, and the variation in the enforcement of laws against bribery across countries challenge some of the assumptions upon which arguments have been built, i.e., that managers can choose appropriate actions without major legal implications. Hence, I first provide suggestion for how to analyze the topic of corruption in future studies by analyzing the types, measures, causes, consequences, and controls of corruption. I then provide suggestions for how to extend leading theories of the firm by using corruption as a laboratory that challenges some of the assumptions of these theories: extending agency theory by analyzing the existence of unethical agency relationships; extending transaction cost economics by analyzing illegal transaction costs minimization; extending the resource-based view by studying corporate social irresponsibility capability; extending resource dependency by analyzing the ethical power escape; and extending neo-institutional theory by studying illegal legitimacy. |
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| Keywords: | Corruption Bribery International business Multinationals Theory |
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