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Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms
Institution:1. Department of Economics “Marco Biagi”, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Viale Berengario 51, 41121, Modena, Italy;2. Essex Business School, University of Essex, Colchester, CO4 3 SQ, UK;3. Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Udine, Via Tomadini 30A, 33100, Udine, Italy;1. International Business School Suzhou, Xi''an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China;2. School of Management, University of Bradford, UK;3. Salford Business School, University of Salford, UK;1. School of Accounting, RMIT University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia;2. Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom;3. Research Professor in Accounting, Adam Smith School of Business, The University of Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom
Abstract:We investigate whether politically connected family firms provide the market with more or less credible earnings compared with unconnected family firms. Our results evidence that politically connected family firms show higher earnings informativeness than unconnected family firms. Our findings are consistent with the market perceiving that, in the presence of political ties, family firms are more likely to reduce information asymmetries by signalling their superior earnings quality.
Keywords:Family control  Political ties  Earnings informativeness  Signalling theory  Bonding mechanisms
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