| 环境会计信息供求双方的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚瑶,周密.环境会计信息供求双方的博弈分析[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2006,20(4):8-12. |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚瑶 周密 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南京大学商学院,江苏南京,210093
2. 湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭,411105 |
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| 摘 要： | 在构建我国环境会计信息披露体系的过程中,我们通常以国家宏观利益为研究导向,忽视信息供求双方的微观利益及其内部效用;以外在制约为主要手段,缺乏内在激励。我国环境信息披露目标难以达成的症结之一在于信息供求双方的内部效用无法满足而造成的披露动力不足。文章以信息供求双方内部效用为逻辑起点进行博弈分析,提出从短期和长期两方面激励企业环境披露信息的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境会计信息披露 信息供求双方 利益 非合作博弈 长期重复博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-6701（2006）04-0008-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 12 17 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-12-17 |
Game Analysis on Suppliers and Demanders of Environmental Accounting Information |
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| YAO Yao,ZHOU Mi.Game Analysis on Suppliers and Demanders of Environmental Accounting Information[J].Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce,2006,20(4):8-12. |
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| Authors: | YAO Yao ZHOU Mi |
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| Institution: | 1. Business School, Nanjing University, Jiangsu Nanjing 210093, China;2. Business School, Xiangtan University, Hunan Xiangtan 411105, China |
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| Abstract: | During the construction of environmental accounting information disclosure system, common studies usually based on the macroscopic direction have ignored the micro benefits of information suppliers and demanders. External restriction as main method and lack of internal incentives cause the rub that the goal of information disclosure can not reach and discourage the information disclosure. Starting from game analysis with their interior utilities, we propose some suggestions for enterprise environment information disclosure from both shot-run and long-run. |
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| Keywords: | information disclosure in environmental accounting information supplier and demander benefits non-cooperative game long-term repeated games |
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