The Coordination and Preference of Supply Chain Contracts Based on Time-Sensitivity Promotional Mechanism

To encourage retailers to submit orders as soon as possible, manufacturers usually launch a time-sensitivity promotional mechanism that the earlier you order, the cheaper the wholesale price will be in advance of the selling season. This paper aims to investigate if the mechanism can improve supply chain performance. A dyadic decentralized supply chain system comprising a single manufacturer and a single retailer is viewed as a research framework. Initially, a benchmark model is proposed to provide a criterion-referenced for coordinating the supply chain in a non-standard distribution environment. Second, a time-sensitive wholesale price contract is constructed to confirm that the mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. However, the retailer accepts the entire forecast risk under the contract. An improved contract called a time-sensitive revenue-sharing contract is constructed based on the notion that the manufacturer shares partial forecast risk. The results show that participants can arbitrarily divide the optimal supply chain’s expected profit between the constructed price contracts; however, two differences exist between the contracts, that is, participants have contract preferences. Finally, a numerical analysis and a few management insights are given.