企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。

Analysis of Corporation M&A Based on Signaling Game

The merger and acquisition is an action of property right and a game process in order to pursue both par- ties'maximum interests under the condition of market economy.Because of converse selection caused by in- formation asymmetry in M&A market,the M&A will appear the following three different market equilibriums, namely separating equilibrium,pooling equilibrium,semi-separating equilibrium,only separating equilibrium is the most ideal and efficient equilibrium.A signaling game model between the acquiring firm and the ac- quired firm is given in this paper.The most effective method of achieving separating equilibrium is to overcome information asymmetry between the acquiring and acquired firm and accurately appraise valuation of acquired firm.