高校扩招后果的经济学分析--基于劳动市场信号发送理论的研究

文章运用劳动市场信号发送理论,分析近年来我国高校大规模扩招所产生的社会经济后果。其基本观点是:在假设教育只具有能力信号功能的前提下,扩招提高了就业门槛,导致教育信号的过度投资,这是雇主和雇员互动博弈的结果。若引入教育的生产力功能,扩招使特质对应的教育水平分布区间加大,原来教育水平可以分离的特质分布区间降低,意味着本科教育的信号区分功能减弱。高能力的本科生为了分离自己会选择更高的教育信号(如研究生),或是追求名校、特殊资质证书等其他信号,教育信号投资的激励增强。如果高校不断扩招,则会形成教育信号投资的不断攀升,并最终导致教育过度。

Effects of Increased Enrollment of High Education--An Analysis Based on the Job Market Signaling Theory

In this paper, job market signaling theory is used to analyze the phenomenon of increased enrollment of high education and its subsequent social and economic results. If education is only a signal, increased enrollment will enhance the employment threshold and therefore cause the undesirable signal overinvestment which is the inter-action result of the game between employees and employers. If education is not only a signal, but can also enhance the productivity, increased enrollment will weaken the signaling effect of undergraduate diplomas, then higher ability undergraduate students will pursue higher education or reputable colleges or other skill certificates as their signals. If the current increased enrollment continues, the overinvestment in education will also continue to increase, ultimately result in over-education.