Say-on-pay judgements: the two-strikes rule and the pay-performance link |
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| Authors: | Yimeng Liang Robyn Moroney Michaela Rankin |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Accounting, Monash Business School, Caulfield East, VIC, Australia;2. Monash Business School, Monash University, Caulfield East, VIC, Australia |
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| Abstract: | We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay-performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay-performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay-performance link on voting intentions. |
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| Keywords: | Executive remuneration Pay-performance link Say-on-pay Two-strikes rule |
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