Trade policy and mixed enterprises |
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Authors: | Ngo Van Long,Frank Stä hler |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, McGill University; Department of Economics, University of Otago |
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Abstract: | Abstract . This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership. |
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Keywords: | F12 F13 |
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