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MBO融资方式与股东财富理论分析
引用本文:冯士伟,王子成.MBO融资方式与股东财富理论分析[J].华东经济管理,2005,19(4):136-138.
作者姓名:冯士伟  王子成
作者单位:同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092;同济大学,研究生院,上海,200092
摘    要:融资方式是各界对我国上市公司MBO中最为关注的核心问题之一。文章区分非流通股东和流通股东两类主体,对MBO后上市公司迫于管理层还款压力而进行高额派现对不同类型股东财富的影响机理进行了解析,发现MBO后高额派现对管理层有利,而对广大外部中小流通股东不利。

关 键 词:管理层收购(MBO)  融资方式  股东财富  理论分析
文章编号:1007-5097(2005)04-0136-03
收稿时间:2005/1/18 0:00:00
修稿时间:2005年1月18日

A Theoretical Analysis of Financing Mode in Management Buy-outs and Stockholders' Wealth
FENG Shi-wei,WANG Zi-chengb.A Theoretical Analysis of Financing Mode in Management Buy-outs and Stockholders' Wealth[J].East China Economic Management,2005,19(4):136-138.
Authors:FENG Shi-wei  WANG Zi-chengb
Institution:a.School of Economics & Management;b. Graduate School, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)
Abstract:Financing mode in management buy-outs is one of the main problems about which many people are concerned. Distinguishing non-current stockholders and current stockholders, the paper takes a theoretical analysis on the effects of the companies' high cash dividends after MBO on different stockholders' wealth because of the pressure of debt on the managements. It finds that high cash dividends are profitable to the managements, but are disadvantageous to the current stockholders.
Keywords:management buy-outs (MBO)  financing mode  stockholder's wealth  theoretical analysis
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