高管薪酬管制、审计意见与审计师选择

本文从高管薪酬管制政策对审计意见的影响入手,系统检验了薪酬管制政策的有效性。研究发现国有企业在实施高管薪酬管制政策的同时,经理人可能通过降低会计信息质量规避社会监督,从而遭受了更多的"非标"审计意见,增大了企业的代理成本。进一步研究发现,国企经理人会通过选择不同质量的审计师来应对增加的代理成本。结论表明,薪酬管制政策只能在短期内和表面上缓解国企过高薪酬的代理问题,需要在实施过程中出台相应的配套措施予以辅助。

Executive Compensation Regulation, Audit Opinion and Auditor Selection

This paper tests the effectiveness of executive compensation regulation policy from the angle of policy influence on audit opinions.We find that under the policy of executive compensation regulation,managers in the state-owned enterprises may avoid social supervision by reducing accounting information quality,which suffer more non-standard audit opinions,and increase the agency cost.Furthermore,it is found that managers may select auditors with different qualities responding to the increasing agency cost.The results show that the compensation regulation policy can only alleviate the agency problem of state-owned enterprises in the short term and on the surface,and subsidiary countermeasures should be supplemented.