| Abstract: | In trying to explain the often painful process of corporate restructuring, fingers are frequently pointed at inefficient management. This gives short shrift, however, to an important result of breaking up large, integrated corporations and selling them in smaller pieces: it makes the capital market more nearly complete, and there are strong theoretical arguments that this enhances value. We report the results of a natural experiment that occurred in the oil and gas industry, in which eleven integrated corporations formed publicly traded partnerships to hold their domestic production properties, yet (with few exceptions) retained most of the partnership units under corporate ownership. This behavior avoids any significant change in corporate governance, and is inconsistent with the tax motive popularly attributed as the reason for forming these partnerships; yet we find that significant positive abnormal returns accrued to stockholders when the formations were announced. The results we observe, therefore, support the theory that additional value can be realized by expanding the set of opportunities available to the investment community. |
