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Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
Authors:David J Cooper  Nick Feltovich  Alvin E Roth  Rami Zwick
Institution:(1) Case Western Reserve University, USA;(2) University of Houston, USA;(3) Harvard University, USA;(4) Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong
Abstract:Learning models predict that the relative speed at which players in a game adjust their behavior has a critical influence on long term behavior. In an ultimatum game, the prediction is that proposers learn not to make small offers faster than responders learn not to reject them. We experimentally test whether relative speed of learning has the predicted effect, by manipulating the amount of experience accumulated by proposers and responders. The experiment allows the predicted learning by responders to be observed, for the first time.
Keywords:Game Theory  learning  bargaining
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