On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment |
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Authors: | Sandrine Ollier |
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Institution: | 1.CRESE,University of France-Cornté,Besan?on Cedex,France |
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Abstract: | Faynzilberg and Kumar (Rev Econ Design 5(1):23–58, 2000) show that the usual Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions to validate the
first-order approach in moral hazard agency models are no longer valid in the generalized agency case. They consider the risk-averse
agent case and identify one set of technological conditions, where the production technology satisfies the linear distribution
function condition in actions and types, that validates ex-ante the first-order approach. With the usefulness of their decomposition approach, we show that the first-order approach in the
generalized agency case can be checked ex-ante under the Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions when the agent is risk-neutral but there is a binding limited liability constraint on the agent’s wage.
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Keywords: | Generalized agency Limited liability First-order approach |
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