Anatomy of financial retardation in a less developed country: The case of Sri Lanka, 1951–1976

An attempt is made in this paper to analyse the experience of Sri Lanka during 1951–1976, particularly in relation to its financial sector development. It is shown that the interventionist regime held the key to the pace and pattern of the economy's development. Whether it was the skimpy growth of the financial system, the faltering progression of GNP, the precarious foreign exchange position, or the persistence of inflationary pressure, they were all traceable to the impact on the financial system of a particular set of policies pursued. The year 1977, however, marked a watershed in Sri Lanka's long quest for economic development. The Government began to unwind the entire paraphernalia of administered controls on consumption, investment and foreign exchange. Most of the price controls were removed, subsidies phased out and public corporations were allowed greater autonomy in their pricing and distribution policies. It is necessary to contrast this situation with what existed prior to 1977 in order to assess its impact on the real economy of Sri Lanka. Only then can the cost of financial retardation be measured.