Examining the effect of deception detection decision aids on investors' perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Grand Valley State University, United States;2. Florida State University, United States;3. Michigan State University, United States;1. Department of Accounting, Purdue University - Northwest, Hammond, IN 46323, United States of America;2. Department of Accounting, Debbie and Jerry Ivy College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1350, United States of America;1. California State University, Fullerton, 800 N. State College Blvd., Fullerton, CA, USA;2. The Caribbean Governance Training Institute, PO Box RB2684, Rodney Bay, Gros Islet, St. Lucia, West Indies;1. University of Central Florida, United States of America;1. School of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science & Technology, Tehran 16846-13114, Iran;2. Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran 14155-6311, Iran;3. Faculty of Economics, University of Tehran, Tehran 14155-6445, Iran |
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| Abstract: | Recent evidence suggests that the trend of issuing video disclosures is growing and investors are exposed to the risk of including deceptive information in their decisions. This study suggests that investors can use deception detection decision aids to identify deceptive behavior in video disclosures, and that the use of such decision aids affects their perceptions of disclosure credibility and willingness to invest. The theoretical framework of this study suggests that providing investors with a deception detection decision aid affects their willingness to invest through their perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that this effect is conditional on management's reputation. Using data from 387 nonprofessional investors, the findings provide support for the predicted effect of deception detection decision aid on investors' judgment and decision making. The effect of providing investors with a deception detection decision aid is fully mediated by investors' perceptions of disclosure credibility, and that effect is significantly stronger when management's reputation is good than when management's reputation is bad. |
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