Emissions trading in Europe: Effective tool or flight of fancy? |
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Authors: | Claudia Kemfert Jochen Diekmann Hans-Joachim Ziesing |
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Institution: | (1) German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Germany;(2) Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany |
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Abstract: | Conclusion The NAPs must be compatible with the climate goals and emissions reduction targets. Within the first period there will be
no concrete sanction mechanism if countries fail to achieve their target, as is planned for later periods. A stringent allocation
of allowances would prevent too high a burden on private households and the transport sector. In addition, it would also increase
the incentive for other flexible mechanisms such as Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and (later on) Joint Implementation
(Jl). Conversely, some important aspects of the trading system, such as the treatment of newcomers or how to react to the
dynamics of the market, are not regulated at the European level. This provides a large scope for strategic action and creates
uncertainties.
In Germany as well as in many other countries, negotiations between politicians and industrial lobbyists has led to a less
effective emissions trading system. It is questionable whether there will be significant emission trading at all. The climate
goal cannot be reached if industries get the emissions allowances that they need to continue business as usual. In the future,
it would be desirable to harmonise the specific rules of the initial allocation plan among all European countries in order
to avoid strategic behaviour and a weakening of the entire trading system. |
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Keywords: | |
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