Equality, Evolution and Partnership Law |
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Authors: | Thomas A Smith |
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Institution: | (1) School of Law, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110-0–2492, USA |
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Abstract: | Equal sharing in partnership law is an ancient rule that has never been adequately explained. An informal model utilizing
Nash bargaining solutions and basic statistical principles suggests that it may be the transactions-cost minimizing rule.
Evolutionary game theory also suggests how psychological dispositions favoring equal sharing may evolve. Psychological dispositions
such as risk aversion are a familiar part of economic analysis of commercial law. However, other evolved dispositions, such
as egalitarianism in certain settings, can also fit into economic legal analysis. Dispositions toward equal sharing and consensual
governance in small productive groups may have evolved during the long period in which humans produced and shared food in
small bands.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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Keywords: | commitment default efficiency fiduciary foragers games trust |
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