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Equality, Evolution and Partnership Law
Authors:Thomas A Smith
Institution:(1) School of Law, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA 92110-0–2492, USA
Abstract:Equal sharing in partnership law is an ancient rule that has never been adequately explained. An informal model utilizing Nash bargaining solutions and basic statistical principles suggests that it may be the transactions-cost minimizing rule. Evolutionary game theory also suggests how psychological dispositions favoring equal sharing may evolve. Psychological dispositions such as risk aversion are a familiar part of economic analysis of commercial law. However, other evolved dispositions, such as egalitarianism in certain settings, can also fit into economic legal analysis. Dispositions toward equal sharing and consensual governance in small productive groups may have evolved during the long period in which humans produced and shared food in small bands. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.
Keywords:commitment  default  efficiency  fiduciary  foragers  games  trust
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