Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal |
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Authors: | Rudolf Kerschbamer Clemens Puppe |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, A-1010 Vienna, Austria;(2) Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany |
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Abstract: | We argue that there are interesting examples of privately provided public goods that do not satisfy the assumption of strict normality, and reconsider voluntary-contribution games in a more general framework. We show that, in general, (1) equalizing transfers between individuals with identical tastes can increase total supply of the public good, and (2) more of the public good can be supplied if agents move sequentially rather than simultaneously. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier conclusions derived in the literature under the assumption of strict normality. |
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Keywords: | public goods private provision nonnormality |
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