The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets |
| |
| Authors: | Tatyana Sokolyk |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. Lord Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University, United Kingdom;2. Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom;3. The Open University, United Kingdom;1. School of Industrial Management, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology, Vietnam National University – Ho Chi Minh City, 268 Ly Thuong Kiet Street, District 10, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam;2. Manning School of Business, University of Massachusetts Lowell, 1 University Avenue, Lowell, MA 01854, United States;3. College of Business, Louisiana Tech University, 502 W Texas Avenue, Ruston, LA 71270, United States;1. Arizona State University, United States;2. George Mason University, United States;3. University of Melbourne, Australia |
| |
| Abstract: | This study provides large sample evidence on the effects of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) on takeover probability and premia in modern takeover contests. Despite the fact that hostile bids are uncommon during the 1990s–2000s, some ATPs have strong but opposing effects on takeover outcomes. Consistent with recent theory, the staggered board-poison pill combination is the strongest antitakeover mechanism. Takeover compensation arrangements reduce managerial resistance to takeovers, and many commonly used ATPs are irrelevant in modern takeover battles. Furthermore, compensation plans are associated with higher takeover premia. Although individual ATPs have significant effects on takeover outcomes, the G-Index, which does not account for the diverse effects of ATPs, is not significant in predicting the firm's takeover probability or the size of takeover premia. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
