| 政府投资高速公路建设项目激励机制研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 曾晓文,李江敏,谢雄标.政府投资高速公路建设项目激励机制研究[J].改革与战略,2010,26(3):45-48. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 曾晓文 李江敏 谢雄标 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 南昌大学管理学院,江西,南昌,330031;江西省鹰瑞高速公路项目建设办公室,江西,抚州,344900
2. 中国地质大学《武汉》经济管理学院,湖北,武汉,430074 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 江西省交通厅科技资助项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 政府投资公路建设项目呈现两级委托代理及四个利益相关方，各方之间的合作行为深受激励机制影响。文章基于委托代理理论，分别对政府与项目业主、项目业主与监理方、项目业主与施工方之间的行为进行了博弈分析，并针对大型高速公路建设项目管理不同利益方构建了相应的激励机制。
|
| 关 键 词： | 政府投资 公路建设项目 委托代理 博弈分析 激励机制 |
Incentive Mechanism of Government-funded Highway Construction Project |
| |
| Zeng Xiaowen,Li Jiangmin,Xie Xiongbiao.Incentive Mechanism of Government-funded Highway Construction Project[J].Reformation & Strategy,2010,26(3):45-48. |
| |
| Authors: | Zeng Xiaowen Li Jiangmin Xie Xiongbiao |
| |
| Institution: | 3 (1. College of Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330031; 2. Jiangxi YingRui Highway Project Management Office, Fuzhou, Jiangxi 344900 3. China University of Geoscience〈Wuhan〉, Wuhan, Hubei 430074) |
| |
| Abstract: | Government-funded highway construction projects present a principal--agent relationship chain at two levels and have four stakeholders under the deputy construction system, and the effect of cooperation among the stakeholders are deeply influenced by the incentive mechanism. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzed the gamble models between government and project owners, project owners and supervisors, project owners and construction party from the perspective of behavior, and established corresponding incentive mechanisms according to different management stakeholders in large-scale highway construction projects. |
| |
| Keywords: | govemment-funded highway construction project principal-agent game analysis incentive mechanism |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
