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Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
Authors:John Wiggs Patty
Institution:Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Abstract:Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters.
Keywords:JEL classification: C72  D72
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