The Information Content of Bank Examinations |
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Authors: | Allen N. Berger Sally M. Davies |
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Affiliation: | (1) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC.;(2) Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Philadelphia |
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Abstract: | We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements. |
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