Payoff-Improving Competition: Games with Negative Externalities |
| |
Authors: | Sekeris Petros G Siqueira Kevin |
| |
Institution: | 1.Montpellier Business School (MBS), 2300 Avenue des Moulins, 34080, Montpellier, France ;2.School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Road, Richardson, TX, 75080-3021, USA ; |
| |
Abstract: | We demonstrate that more intense competition in games with production and negative externalities may be payoff-improving, and therefore welcomed by incumbents. In games that feature equilibria with strategic complements, increased competition may give rise to a new equilibrium where aggregate effort is lower, and the resulting reduced levels of externalities ultimately leaves all players better off. This setting applies to models of Cournot oligopoly, of common pool resources, and contests with endogenous prizes. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|