The closed‐loop effect and the profitability of horizontal mergers |
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Authors: | Hassan Benchekroun |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, CIREQ, McGill University |
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Abstract: | Abstract. We study the profitability of horizontal mergers in a dynamic competition context with sticky prices. It is shown that, when firms use open‐loop strategies, a merger is profitable only if the share of the market that merges is significant enough. In the case where firms use closed‐loop strategies we provide a method to conduct analytically the study of the profitability of horizontal mergers. We first prove the existence of an equilibrium of the game when a subset of firms merges. When firms use feedback strategies, mergers are profitable even when the share of the market that merges is arbitrarily small. JEL Classification:D4, L13 |
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