Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator |
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Authors: | Alexander Matros |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, SC, USAb School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK |
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Abstract: | We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price. |
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Keywords: | C73 D44 D82 |
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