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Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments
Authors:Kasper LeufkensRonald Peeters
Institution:
  • Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
  • Abstract:We consider a dynamic homogeneous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments increase profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conducted provide support for the first effect and against the second effect when a random ending rule is applied. When a fixed ending rule is applied, we find no significant impact of short-run price commitments on profits and price stability.
    Keywords:C91  D43
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