Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets |
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Authors: | Esther Hauk Sjaak Hurkens |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, SPAIN (e-mail: esther.hauk@econ.upf.es) , ES |
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Abstract: | Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases:Information acquisition Oligopoly Uncertainty Bayesian equilibrium |
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