Almost common values auctions revisited |
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Authors: | Dan Levin |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 410 Arps Hall, 1945 North High St., Columbus, OH 43210 1172, USA |
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Abstract: | In almost common-value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private-value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure second-price common-value auction. We explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second-price auctions, and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending-price English auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries. |
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Keywords: | D44 D89 |
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