Competition between insurers with superior information |
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Authors: | Bertrand Villeneuve |
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Institution: | CEA-IDEI, Université de Toulouse I, Place A. France, 31042 Toulouse cedex, France |
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Abstract: | We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable. We also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms. Our analysis of the “contrary of adverse selection” (competition between principals with common value and exclusivity) is suitable for other markets (lawyers, doctors, mechanics, etc.). |
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Keywords: | D43 D82 G22 |
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