| 企业融资中的银行角色与最优融资契约 |
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| 引用本文： | 张弢.企业融资中的银行角色与最优融资契约[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2011(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 张弢 |
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| 作者单位： | 南开大学,公司治理研究中心,天津,300071 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金重大项目，教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文对企业融资中银行所扮演的角色进行分析,发现银行以债权人身份参与企业融资时,只有当企业的自有资金达到一定数量时银行才会接受契约,但是银行的清算威胁不起作用;当银行以股东角色参与企业融资时,清算威胁会降低企业的道德风险,企业的清算价值与自有资金之间的关系会对企业的融资起到至关重要的作用;当银行以混合角色参与企业融资时,银行的清算威胁仍会起到一定的作用,但是对企业的清算价值具有一定的放松,同时企业与享有股权的银行会产生共谋,损害以债权进行投资的银行的利益,企业的最优努力程度会发生偏离,增加了企业的道德风险.
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| 关 键 词： | 银行股权 银行债权 银行监督 清算威胁 企业融资 |
The Bank Role in Corporate Finance and the Optimal Financing Contracts |
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| ZHANG Tao.The Bank Role in Corporate Finance and the Optimal Financing Contracts[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2011(2). |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Tao |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Tao(Center for Studies of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper develops a model to analyze the bank role in corporate finance,and finds that bank debt would accept contract only if corporation wealth is higher than a certain proportion,and threat of liquidation is non-functional;Moral hazard would be lower by threat of liquidation as role of bank equity,and the relation of liquidation value and corporation wealth would play a crucial role in financing.Threat of liquidation would be effective whereas liquidation value would be relaxed in mixed contract.And mi... |
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| Keywords: | Bank Equity Bank Debt Bank Monitoring Threat of Liquidation Corporate Finance |
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