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自主创新激励下企业政府采购最优出价行为研究
引用本文:熊启跃,张依茹.自主创新激励下企业政府采购最优出价行为研究[J].湖北商业高等专科学校学报,2012(2):79-83.
作者姓名:熊启跃  张依茹
作者单位:武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072
基金项目:武汉大学研究生自主科研项目(201110501020007)
摘    要:在政府采购过程中,促进自主创新的政策与公开招标经济目标之间存在着一定冲突。本文在一价密封模型的基础上,通过改变供应商的效用函数,考察了政府鼓励自主创新条件下企业(供应商)的最优报价。结果表明:政府扶持自主创新的政策会改变供应商的出价机制,获得优惠较多的供应商会提高报价,并且随着竞标人数的增多最优价格将接近中标企业的成本。

关 键 词:政府采购  招投标  优惠政策  一价密封

Study on Suppliers' Optimal Bidding Price under Incentive Policy in the Process of Government Procurement
XIONG Qi-yue,ZHANG Yi-ru.Study on Suppliers' Optimal Bidding Price under Incentive Policy in the Process of Government Procurement[J].Journal of Hubei Commercial College,2012(2):79-83.
Authors:XIONG Qi-yue  ZHANG Yi-ru
Institution:(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan Hubei 430072,China)
Abstract:In the process of government procurement,there are contradictions between the policy of promoting independent innovations and the achievement of economic targets.With the purpose of studying suppliers' optimal bidding price under preferential policies towards independent innovation enterprises,this passage modifies the enterprises utility function and deduces the optimal bidding price under the classic SIPV model.The results show that:the preferential policies will affect the suppliers' bidding prices,the more preferential the policy,the higher the bidding price.
Keywords:government procurement  public auction  preferential policy first-price sealed bidding
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