| 股权集中、行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯:由我国上市公司生发 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 刘星,谢斯静. 股权集中、行业竞争与薪酬业绩牵扯:由我国上市公司生发[J]. 改革, 2011, 0(4) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 刘星 谢斯静 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院; |
| |
| 基金项目： | 重庆市软科学研究计划重点项目“重庆市国有企业高管人员薪酬激励的问题与对策研究”(批准号:CSTC,2010CE0034) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 对上市公司股权集中度、行业竞争度对薪酬业绩敏感性影响的研究发现:股权集中度与薪酬业绩敏感性呈现倒U形关系。当股权集中度达到较高水平,即第一大股东绝对控股后,与国有企业相比,民营企业的大股东监督对薪酬业绩敏感性的替代作用更强。在外部治理方面,行业竞争度与薪酬业绩敏感性显著正相关,表明高竞争强度可以在一定程度上强化薪酬契约的激励作用。
|
| 关 键 词： | 股权集中 最终控制人性质 行业竞争 薪酬业绩敏感性 |
The Involvement of Ownership Concentration,Industry Competition,Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance: Generated from Chinese Listed-Firms |
| |
| Liu Xing Xie Sijing. The Involvement of Ownership Concentration,Industry Competition,Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance: Generated from Chinese Listed-Firms[J]. Reform, 2011, 0(4) |
| |
| Authors: | Liu Xing Xie Sijing |
| |
| Affiliation: | Liu Xing Xie Sijing |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of ownership concentration and industry competition on the sensibility between executive compensation and corporate performance and finds that it is a reverse U type relationship between the ownership concentration and the sensibility between executive compensation and corporate performance.When the concentration of ownership is high,compared with the state-owned enterprises,the block holder monitoring of private enterprises has a more significant negative effect on the sensib... |
| |
| Keywords: | ownership concentration ultimate ownership industry competition sensibility between executive compensation and corporate performance |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
