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医疗费用世界难题最优解的博弈论分析
引用本文:王鉴岗.医疗费用世界难题最优解的博弈论分析[J].社会保障研究,2010(1):70-72.
作者姓名:王鉴岗
作者单位:中国青年政治学院社会工作学院,北京,100089
摘    要:医疗费用控制是世界难题,原因在于现行医疗费用支付方式下医保和医院的博弈不存在医疗资源配置帕累托最优的均衡解。当医保按服务项目支付时,医院会选择过多服务策略;当医保按总额预算支付时,医院会选择过少服务策略。如果医保在支付周期的期末确定医疗费用支付方式,则医院会选择按预算总额提供服务策略,医疗资源配置也不能实现帕累托最优。改变动态博弈模式为静态博弈模式,并且医保以随机方法决定医疗费用支付方式,则只要支付方式的概率分布选择合理,博弈的均衡总能够实现医疗资源配置的帕累托最优。

关 键 词:医疗费用支付方式  博弈  帕累托最优

Game Theory Analysis on the Optimum Solution of Medical Expenses as a Worldwide Puzzle
WANG Jiangang.Game Theory Analysis on the Optimum Solution of Medical Expenses as a Worldwide Puzzle[J].Social Security Studies,2010(1):70-72.
Authors:WANG Jiangang
Institution:WANG Jiangang
Abstract:Medical expenditure control is a difficult international problem. It is because that equilibrium solution of Pareto optimality do not exist in the game between the medical insurance and hospital under the current medical expenses payment pattern. When medical insurance is paid for service,hospital could choose excessive services strategy; when medical insurance is paid for global budget, hospital could choose too few services stategy. If medical expenses payment pattern of medical insurance is determined at...
Keywords:medical expenses payment pattern  game  Pareto optimality  
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