Farsightedly stable networks |
| |
Authors: | P Jean-Jacques Herings Ana Mauleon Vincent Vannetelbosch |
| |
Institution: | aDepartment of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands;bFNRS and CEREC, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, Boulevard du Jardin Botanique 43, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium;cFNRS and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium |
| |
Abstract: | A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. |
| |
Keywords: | Networks Farsighted players Stability Pairwise deviations Efficiency |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|