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医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制
引用本文:潘常刚,薛新东.医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制[J].中国药物经济学,2009(3):40-45.
作者姓名:潘常刚  薛新东
作者单位:中南财经政法大学公共管理学院,武汉,430060
摘    要:不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,但政府的过度干预会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行“管办不分”的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。

关 键 词:市场失灵  政府干预  声誉机制  重复博弈

Government Intervention and Reputation Mechanism in Medical Field
PAN Chang-gang,XUE Xin-dong.Government Intervention and Reputation Mechanism in Medical Field[J].China Journal of Pharmaceutical Economics,2009(3):40-45.
Authors:PAN Chang-gang  XUE Xin-dong
Institution:(School of Public Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430060, China)
Abstract:Uncertainty and information asymmetry are often considered to be foundations of medical market failure and government intervention, however, the excessive government intervention will lead to distortion of medical reputation mechanism. Reform the current medical and health system which disseparation of supervisor and service supply, use market reputation to replace governmental administrative intervention, through repeated games to establish long-term and stable relations between doctors and patients, solve the problem in medical and health field.
Keywords:market failure  government intervention  reputation mechanism  repeated games
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