Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs |
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Authors: | Jason F Shogren |
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Institution: | Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071, USA |
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Abstract: | Delay costs play a role in Coasean bargaining over environmental conflicts when an injunction restricts actions until a settlement is reached. Results from the lab suggest that efficiency remained relatively robust to discrete and increasing marginal delay costs, but declined significantly with nonincreasing marginal delay costs. Bargainers appear to deal with probability and consequences separately rather than in combination as maintained by expected utility theory, and as such, neglect ends over means. How the distribution of wealth is best organized depends on perspective: constrained self-interest best organizes behavior if expected utility is maintained; pure self-interest dominates if we acknowledge the probability–consequence heuristic. |
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