Restraints of trade by durable good producers |
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Authors: | Roger D Blair Jill Boylston Herndon |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Florida, P.O. Box 117140, 32611-7140, Gainesville, FL, USA 2. Department of Management and Economics, Hamline University, 55104-1284, St. Paul, MN, USA
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Abstract: | Whether they face competition or not, durable good producers may have an incentive to impose vertical restraints on their customers in order to protect quasi-rents in the aftermarkets for maintenance and repair. In this paper, we show that these vertical restraints have little to do with the usual antitrust concerns regarding tying arrangements. Nonetheless, imposing such restraints involves antitrust risks. We examine these risks and the associated antitrust policy questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent Kodak decision. We also offer some suggestions for the appropriate antitrust policy. |
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