政府控制层级、地方政府政绩考核与公司真实盈余管理——来自中国地级市上市公司的证据

本文以我国A股市场2007年—2011年的地级市上市公司为样本,在我国以经济增长为核心的政治锦标赛制为制度的背景下,考察了政府控制层级、地方政府政绩考核压力对公司真实盈余管理程度的影响。研究结果表明：以GDP增长率为地方政府政绩衡量指标对企业真实盈余管理程度的确存在着显著影响。当地方政府面临政绩考核压力时,上市公司更倾向于利用销售调节和可操纵性费用的方式进行真实盈余管理活动。进一步来看,较之中央政府控制企业而言,GDP增长率与地方企业真实盈余管理程度更显著相关。本文研究证实了地方政府片面追求GDP增长的负面效应,进一步支撑了改进我国地方政府政绩考核方式的必要性。

Government Control Level,Achievement Evaluation and the Real Earnings Management---Based on Data from Listed Companies in Prefecture-level Cities

Using the data of A - share listed companies from 2007 to 2011 in the prefecture - level cities in China, the paper examines the impact of the government control level and the local government＇ s pressure of performance evaluation on the company＇ s real earnings management under the background of tournament system based on the economic growth. The empirical results show the degree of the real earnings management is significantly negative with the GDP growth in the prefecture - level cities. The listed companies tend to manipulate the sales practices and reduce the handling costs when the local governments face pressure of the performance evaluation. The further studies show the negative relation is more significant in the local government - controlled companies compared with the central government - controlled companies. This paper confirms the negative effects from the economic growth, which supports the necessity to improve the methods of performance evaluation on the local government.