Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent |
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Authors: | Fee C Edward; Hadlock Charles J |
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Institution: | Michigan State University |
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Abstract: | We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer(CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibitaboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is morepronounced for more senior executives. No such relationshipexists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restrictedstock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood ofjumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on themanagement team increases the likelihood that executives willleave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used toattract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeitedat the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. |
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