国有企业的逆退出与退出定价

中国国有企业改革中的一个有趣的现象是，国有企业的退出并不总是顺序选择的，政府在选择退出的国有企业时，会选择部分好的企业先于部分差的企业退出，即采取逆退出策略。既有的讨论国有企业退出的文献以及把企业退出与激励相联系的理论很难对此现象作出合理的解释。本文从国有企业退出与激励机制设计约束相结合的角度进行了探讨。其结论是，国有企业的逆退出现象可以从预算约束的硬化条件下棘轮效应的角度加以理解。政企不分格局的改变会对政府采取逆退出策略起到进一步的推动作用，政府采取逆退出策略有利于国有企业竞争力的提升。

Adverse Exiting of State-owned Enterprises and Pricing of Exiting

During the process of state-owned enterprises reforming, one of the most interesting is adverse exit, that the local governments select state-ownedenterprises in good situation to exit priority to enterprises in bad situation. Although there are much literatures discussing the exiting of state-owned enterprises , few explained the adverse exiting. This paper would like to answer it basing on combining both incentive design constraints and exiting. It proves that adverse exiting will motivate local governments to improve incentive institution and benefit efficiency of the whole state-owned enterprises. It also discuss the effects of embedness of enterprises in government and reach the conclusion that embedness will produce negative impact on adverse exiting.