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| 国有企业内部人控制下的公司治理 | |
| 引用本文： | 罗正雄,李德燊,范建国.国有企业内部人控制下的公司治理[J].贵州商业高等专科学校学报,2008,21(3):35-37. |
| 作者姓名： | 罗正雄 李德燊 范建国 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 贵州商业高等专科学校,财政金融系,贵州,贵阳,550004 2. 贵州省发展和改革委员会体改处,贵州,贵阳,550001 3. 贵州武警总队第一支队,贵州,贵阳,550004 |
| 摘 要： | 国有企业行政上的“超强控制”和产权上的“超弱控制”，使政府不能对经理进行有效的监督和激励，导致了内部人控制问题的产生，给国有企业带来严重的危害。通过在委托一代理关系下构建内部人控制博弈模型并对模型进行分析，得出结论：解决内部人控制问题必须要从内外两方面完善国有企业公司治理结构。 |
| 关 键 词： | 国有企业 内部人控制 委托-代理博弈 公司治理 |
A study of Corporate Governance in the Insider control State-owned Enterprise |
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| Luo Zheng-xiong,Li De-shen,Fan Jian-guo.A study of Corporate Governance in the Insider control State-owned Enterprise[J].Journal of Guizhou Commercial College,2008,21(3):35-37. | |
| Authors: | Luo Zheng-xiong Li De-shen Fan Jian-guo |
| Institution: | Luo Zheng-xiong1,Li De-shen2,Fan Jian-guo3(1.Guizhou Commercial College,Guiyang,Guizhou 550004,2.Guizhou development , reform commission,5500013.The 1st detachment of Guizhou armed police,Guizhou,550004) |
| Abstract: | The superior control of State-owned Enterprises' administration and the inferior control of Property right prevent the government from supervising and controlling efficiently,which result in the problem of Insider Control and bring serious harm to the State-owned Enterprises.In the matter of Commission-Agent,we produce the model of Insider Control and come to the conclusion that in order to solve it we have to perfect the managing structure from both inside and outside. |
| Keywords: | State-owned Enterprise Insider control Commission-Agent gaming Corporate governance |
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