The strategic value of recall |
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Authors: | Ron Peretz |
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Institution: | Tel-Aviv University, Israel |
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Abstract: | This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (
Lehrer, 1988] and Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents. |
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Keywords: | C72 C73 |
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