| 盈余操纵与公司内部激励的关系研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 郭均英,薛皓. 盈余操纵与公司内部激励的关系研究[J]. 财会通讯, 2005, 0(9) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 郭均英 薛皓 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 武汉大学商学院 湖北武汉430072(郭均英)，武汉大学商学院 湖北武汉430072(薛皓) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 盈余操纵不仅会损害利益相关人特别是公司股东的利益,造成资源的不合理配置,同时它还会削弱国家宏观经济的调控能力,影响证券市场的健康发展。本文试图通过建模阐释:公司总经理(CEO)的盈余操纵行为是怎样严重扭曲公司内部激励的动机和破坏公司价值的创造的。
|
| 关 键 词： | 盈余操纵 短期激励 CEO 告发 公司价值 |
Research on the Relation Between Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms |
| |
| Guo Junying Xue Hao. Research on the Relation Between Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms[J]. Communication of Finance and Accounting, 2005, 0(9) |
| |
| Authors: | Guo Junying Xue Hao |
| |
| Abstract: | Earnings manipulation of the corporate not only undermines the interests of relevant stakeholders, especially the interests of shareholders, and causes the unreasonable distribution of resources, but also jeopardizes the micro-adju stments and regulations of the State, and the healthy development of capital market. This article is trying to demonstrate how the behavior of CEO's earnings ma nipulation distorts the incentives in firms and obstructs the creation of firm's value through modeling. |
| |
| Keywords: | Earnings manipulation Short-term incentives CEO Whistleblowing Firm's value |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录！ |
