| 金融机构多层委托——代理关系的道德风险模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹元芳,王若平. 金融机构多层委托——代理关系的道德风险模型分析[J]. 金融理论与实践, 2007, 51(11): 11-13 |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹元芳 王若平 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津财经大学,天津,300000;中国人民银行天津分行,天津,300040 |
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| 摘 要： | 道德风险问题是我国金融业普遍存在的问题,许多金融案件的发生无不与金融从业人员的职业道德水平有关.而目前金融系统实行的多层级委托代理经营管理模式存在制度缺陷和道德风险隐患.
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| 关 键 词： | 金融机构 委托代理 道德风险 博弈模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-4625（2007）11-0011-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-09-01 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-09-01 |
Analysis on the Moral Hazard Model of Multilevel Entrustment-agency Relation |
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| Cao Yuan-fang,Wang Ruo-ping. Analysis on the Moral Hazard Model of Multilevel Entrustment-agency Relation[J]. Financial Theory and Practice, 2007, 51(11): 11-13 |
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| Authors: | Cao Yuan-fang Wang Ruo-ping |
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| Abstract: | Moral hazard is a common problem in financial industry in China. Many financial cases are closely related to the low level professional morality of financial staff members. The current managerial mode of multilevel entrustment-agency relation in financial industry has institutional flaws and hidden moral hazards. |
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| Keywords: | financial institutions entrustment-agency moral hazard game model |
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