A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result |
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Authors: | René Kirkegaard |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Brock University, 500 Glenridge Avenue, L2S 3A1 St. Catharines, Ontario, CANADA |
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Abstract: | Summary. Bulow and Klemperer 1] have provided an upper bound on the value of bargaining power for a seller of an indivisible object. Specifically, negotiating optimally with N buyers yields lower revenue than an English auction with N + 1 buyers. In this paper, a short and intuitive proof of this result is presented.Received: 2 August 2004, Revised: 6 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
C78, D44, D82.I would like to thank Per B. Overgaard and an anonymous referee for many valuable comments. |
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Keywords: | Auctions Negotiations Rationing |
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